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Abstract 
This article argues that constitutionalism is a 'disease' that af- 
flicts Thailand's body politic, reflecting intense contestation 
among rival elite power-holders. The recent debates concerning 
political reform in Thailand (which culminated in the promul- 
gation of the 1997 constitution) illustrate this contestation 
vividly. The vague, positive-sounding term 'political reform' 
actually means many different things to different people: it is a 
highly contested concept which has been used to legitimate a 
variety of political agendas, ranging from progressive ideas, to 
deeply conservative and even anti-democratic sentiments. The 
resulting constitution is an excessively long and deeply unsatis- 
factory document. Nevertheless, it may contain certain details 
that offer opportunities for the future opening-up of greater 
political space. 
Background 
Thailand has had sixteen constitutions since the end of the ab- 
solute monarchy in 1932: in other words, the average Thai con- 
stitution has lasted just over four years.' Constitution-fre- 
quency on this scale (like the coup frequency for which 
Thailand is also famous) is tantamount to a form of 'permanent 
constitutionalism', analogous to the Trotskyite notion of 
'permanent revolution'. Thailand is one of those countries 
where constitutions 'are constantly and continually torn up to 
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make new ones' (Finer et al. 1995: 2). Whereas in some countries 
the constitution is often treated with a kind of exalted reverence 
which borders on the mystical (the US being the most con- 
spicuous example), in Thailand the constitution has often been 
a central space for contesting day-to-day political realities. Each 
new shift in power, whether initiated by a military coup or 
reflecting a rise in civilian influence, is marked by a new con- 
stitution, a new high watermark which illustrates the 
constantly shifting political tides. Whereas a constitution for 
many other countries is something above the fray of day-to-day 
politics, a document treated with considerable respect and 
tampered with only in extremis, the Thai constitution is a 
political football to be kicked around by the winning team. 
Changing the constitution is a relatively mundane matter, the 
predictable outcome of a shift in power. As Chai-Anan 
Samudavanija-one of Thailand's most dedicated students and 
practitioners of constitutionalism-has observed, amending the 
constitution is part of a 'vicious cycle' of constant but 
ultimately static political change (Chai-Anan 1982: 1-3). A 
military coup is followed by a revision of the constitution, 
elections are then held, but a political crisis develops which 
precipitates a further coup, and so on. A new power elite seeks 
to legitimate its rule by imposing a new constitution; yet that 
constitution itself becomes the basis for a new round of political 
contestation, which in turn brings about abrogation or revision 
of the constitution. 
In practice, constitutionalism has undergone various phases 
in the post-1932 period. The first phase was ushered in with the 
promulgation of the second constitution in December 1932, 
which set the tone for subsequent constitutions over the next 
twenty-six years: parliament was to be firmly subordinated to 
the power of the executive (Wilson 1967: 16). A second phase 
began after Field Marshal Sarit seized power in 1958: the 1959 
interim constitution remained in effect for a decade, and par- 
liamentary politics were suspended. A third phase arguably 
started with the promulgation of the 1968 constitution, which 
marked the beginning of a limited opening up of the political 
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order. When the Thanom regime to sought to reverse that 
opening up by suspending parliament and introducing the 
more authoritarian 1972 constitution, the scene was set for the 
popular uprising of October 1973. Since 1973, constitutionalism 
has been more than a fact of Thai political life; it has become a 
way of life for political actors in Thailand. One of the issues 
underlying the bloody 1992 May events in Bangkok was dis- 
agreement about constitutional changes. The abuse or mis- 
handling of the constitution-drafting process by elites can pro- 
voke popular discontent, mass protests and even bloodshed. 
Often seen as a cure for the country's political ills, constitu- 
tionalism could also be seen as a political 'disease' that para- 
lyses and distorts Thai public life. Preoccupations with consti- 
tutional revision can feed the ambitions of academics, lawyers 
and superannuated senators. These professional constitution 
drafters appear to hanker after the creation of a 'real' Thai con- 
stitution, which, unlike all previous Thai constitutions, will be 
fail-safe, foolproof, cast-iron, lasting and eternal. Those who 
succeed in creating the immortal 'real' constitution will go 
down in history as Thailand's Thomas Jeffersons. The myth of 
the real Thai constitution, like the chimera of the real Thai 
political party (McCargo 199%: 114-31), may be seen as a 
mirage. 
Chai-Anan Samudavanija himself is perhaps the ultimate 
professional constitution drafter, proud of his role in formu- 
lating the 1974 constitution (see Chai-Anan 1990 for details of 
how he came to this task as an 'academic greenhorn'). Like 
many of his fellow 'professional' constitutionalists, Chai-Anan 
did graduate work in the US, and appears to have imbibed a 
quasi-American reverence for the constitution from this experi- 
ence. The American passion for the constitution reflects a num- 
ber of historical facts. The US constitution emerged from a bit- 
ter revolutionary struggle, from a rejection of the British 
government and monarchy, and from the lack of any long 
historical tradition (Finer et al. 1995: 7-8). In the absence of other 
national monuments, the Americans created a written one, a set 
of stone tablets which gave substance and meaning to their 
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emergent nation. For most Europeans, the American attach- 
ment to the constitution is faintly comical, testifying to funda- 
mental insecurities of national history and identity. For the Thai 
elite to emulate the American pattern is perhaps somewhat 
surprising, given the long history of Siam, the existence of a 
constitutional monarchy, and lack of any major independence 
movement or revolutionary struggle. Arguably, the Thai pre- 
occupation with constitutionalism reflects a recurrent desire to 
establish firmer foundations for the relatively shaky political 
order that replaced the absolute monarchy. By merely replacing 
one oligarchy with another (Girling 1981: 60), the 1932 changes 
left Siam (and later Thailand) with a good deal of unfinished 
political business. 
Despite the ironies and paradoxes that pervade much Thai 
constitutionalism, the constitution-drafting process can some- 
times take on a life of its own, influencing the political process 
in unexpected ways, and inadvertently allowing rays of pro- 
gressive light to penetrate Thailand's dark caves of legalism 
and muddle-headedness. In February 1991, a military coup 
ousted elected Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan. The 
coup group, known as the National Peace Keeping Council 
(NPKC), immediately abrogated the constitution and 
established a committee to draft a new one. By packing the 
committee, and leaning on its members, the NPKC ensured that 
the end product pleased almost no one. In particular, one 
clause allowed for the possibility that a non-MP could become 
Prime Minister. The constitution-drafting process mobilised 
considerable forces, both enlisting academics and others 
sympathetic to the military and co-opting them by enrolling 
them into the drafting committee, and also by offering a focus 
for political dissent which was directed at the drafting process 
rather than the coup group itself. The political movement 
generated by the constitution-drafting process culminated in 
the largest political rally to be held in Thailand since 1976, a 
gathering of over 50,000 protesters held at the Sanam Luang in 
November 1991 (see McCargo 1997d: 240-41). 
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The following month, the unsatisfactory draft constitution 
was passed anyway. As Hewison has noted, Thailand's consti- 
tutional monarch, King Bhumiphol, has often shown a lack of 
enthusiasm for the 'foreign' ideas of constitutionalism 
(Hewison 1997: 68-73), and declared that although the 1991 
constitution was 'not ... fully adequate', it could always be 
amended later on (Hewison 1997: 70). But the inadequacy of the 
new constitution gave the green light for coup leader General 
Suchinda Kraprayoon to exploit the provision for an unelected 
Premier to become Prime Minister in April 1992-a move 
which precipitated mass demonstrations, the use of lethal force 
against civilians, scores of deaths, and the political crisis known 
as the May events (for accounts, see Callahan 1998; McCargo 
1997d: 240-74; Physicians for Human Rights 1992). A constitu- 
tion-drafting process which was intended to consolidate the 
NPKC's grip on power, to co-opt sympathetic elites, and to 
divert political dissent away from the coup group, wholly 
failed to achieve its objective. The constitution-drafting directly 
precipitated a new crisis which undermined the objectives of 
the military coup itself. 
Constitutional change, far from being concerned with re- 
forming or overhauling Thailand's political order, has more 
generally been associated with consolidating the elite's mono- 
poly on power, and diverting potentially dissident intellectuals 
and critics down culs-de-sac of committee meetings. The pre- 
occupation with revising the constitution, which has long tor- 
mented the Thai elite, reflects fundamental insecurities about 
the purpose and direction of the Thai political order; more im- 
portantly, it reflects a continuing concern with the legitimation 
of power. Nevertheless, to revise the constitution is to open up 
a kind of political space, a veritable Pandora's box of competing 
interests and demands. As Thai politics becomes increasingly 
pluralistic (not increasingly democratic; see McCargo 1997c), 
the demands of different interest groups for a share of the con- 
stitution-drafting cake become more vocal. As the capacity of 
state elites to control the political agenda becomes increasingly 
undermined by a rise in pluralism, and by the erosion of state 
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capacity associated with the globalisation of the economy, so 
the potential for reformist life to spring forth during the con- 
stitution-drafting process becomes greater, despite the best 
intentions of the ruling elites and their comrades-in-arms, the 
professional constitution drafters. The political reform move- 
ment of 1994-97, which culminated in the promulgation of a 
new constitution in November 1997, reflected a high degree of 
contestation among different interest groups, whose agendas 
ranged from the deeply conservative to the highly progressive. 
The need for reform 
By 1997, there could be little'doubt that the Thai political order 
was in need of substantive reform. At the heart of the problem 
was a crisis of confidence in electoral politics. The rise of vote- 
buying and other forms of electoral corruption (see Callahan 
and McCargo 1996; Sombat 1993) meant that the electoral pro- 
cess was becoming increasingly exclusionary, controlled by an 
unholy alliance of so-called 'professional politicians', provincial 
crooks and hoodlums, unsavoury business interests, large com- 
panies, and third-rate ex-soldiers and bureaucrats (Surin and 
McCargo 1997). These groups had been beneficiaries of the 
'inadequate' 1991 constitutional arrangements, under which 
they had thrived and flourished. At the same time, the reasons 
for the shambolic state of electoral politics-which produced 
such inept Prime Ministers as Banharn Silpa-archa and Chavalit 
Yongchaiyudh, and meant that even a more plausible Premier 
such as Chuan Leekpai had to keep the likes of Suthep Theuk- 
suban2 in his cabinet-went much deeper than mere questions 
of constitutional arrangements and electoral laws, and resulted 
from the nature of Thailand's political economy in the 1990s. 
The criminal and semi-criminal elements so over-represented in 
the Thai parliament had benefited immeasurably from Thai- 
land's boom economy during the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
creaming off many of the benefits of economic growth for 
themselves and for their supporters. Although legal changes 
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might have some marginal effect on their influence, forcing 
them to adopt different strategies in seeking elections, technical 
revisions of the constitution and associated laws would not be 
sufficient to legislate these groups out of office. 
Events leading to the 1997 csnstitutional reform 
The conflict between the National Peace Keeping Council and 
other political forces during the February 1991-May 1992 
period had been symbolised by a series of disputes over the 
nature of the Thai constitution. Central issues included the 
question of whether a non-MP could be Prime Minister (fine if 
the non-MP were Anand, unacceptable if he were Suchinda), 
and the relative powers of the elected lower house and the ap- 
pointed Senate. As Kusuma Snitwongse noted (Kusuma 1995: 
194): 
It was to be expected that the 'angelic' coalition 
government led by Prime Minister Chuan would 
take the lead in amending the Constitution to bring 
about a truly functioning democratic system. 
This expectation was not to be realised. Opposition parties, 
senators, and the New Aspiration Party (then a member of the 
government coalition) sought to block progressive amendment 
of the constitution. Chuan himself, essentially a conservative 
whose primary preoccupation was retaining power even if this 
meant treading water on important political issues, was not 
wholeheartedly committed to forcing through amendments. 
But his administration came under sustained pressure to do so 
from the Palang Dharma Party, and from extra-parliamentary 
forces which had been associated with the anti-military protests 
of the May 1992 events. 
At the height of a tense political stand-off over constitutional 
reform in June 1994, precipitated by the hunger strike of promi- 
nent activist Chalard Vorachat, the Democrats set up the 
Democratic Development Committee (DDC) to draw up a set of 
proposals for far-reaching political reforms. The committee was 
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chaired by Dr Prawes Wasi, a medical practitioner with close 
links to the NGO community. Prawes's considerable achieve- 
ments (he had won a Magsaysay prize in the 1970s), his impres- 
sive range of connections, and his reputation for great integrity, 
have made him a kind of non-partisan elder statesman in Thai 
society. Early in 1995, the DDC unveiled its proposals; these 
involved an elaborate parliamentary system which would have 
three main components, and would separate legislative from 
executive functions so that MPs could not hold ministerial 
office (for details, see Democratic Development Committee 
1995 and Prawes 1995). By the time the DDC presented its 
report, political conditions had greatly changed. The Democrat 
administration was fighting for its very survival over a huge 
land reform scandal. The DDC1s proposals were generally re- 
garded as idealistic and unworkable (Democrat politician 
Abhisit Vejjajiva memorably remarked that he would support 
any plan for political reform except the DDC's proposal), and 
were largely forgotten when the Chuan government collapsed 
following a no-confidence debate in May 1995. 
Although the specific proposals of the DDC quickly fell by 
the wayside, the general question of reforming the political 
system remained very much a live issue, and Prawes himself 
saw the promulgation of the 1997 constitution as a direct out- 
come of the DDC's work. Dr Prawes's cure was much-disputed, 
but his diagnosis was widely accepted. He had identified eight 
basic problems in the Thai political system which were in 
urgent need of reform (Prawes 1995: 3): 
* The dominance of money 
The monopolisation of politics by a minority 
The difficulties faced by good and able people in entering 
politics 
Dishonest and improper behaviour 
Parliamentary dictatorship 
Political conflict and instability 
Q Poor quality of administrative and legislative functions 
* Lack of political leadership 
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Although the clamour for political reform might seem to have 
signified demands for greater democracy, this was not neces- 
sarily the case for all those urging reform. Political reform was 
an intensely contested concept. Demands for political reform 
reflected the desire of competing groups in Thai society to re- 
negotiate (and so enhance) their political power. Reform could 
be attractive to the military if it reduced the power of elected 
politicians; similarly, political reform could appeal to the Bang- 
kok business community if it offered to reduce the influence of 
provincial business people. Prawes was right to point out that 
the parliamentary system concentrated power in the hands of a 
minority: but which minority could not be trusted with power? 
His reference to 'good and capable' people who found diffi- 
culty in getting elected suggested that there might be a group 
of virtuous technocrats well qualified to administer the coun- 
try, perhaps comprising people like Anand Panya ra~hun .~  
Political conflict and instability might seem to be undesirable, 
but would a more stable, more repressive and more authorita- 
rian order be more desirable? Clearly, some groups might 
prefer a more authoritarian order, and others would not. 
Noticeably absent from Prawes's eight points was any explicit 
reference to the need for more effective representative govern- 
ment, which would respond better to popular demands. 
Political reform meant different things to different groups, and 
could easily focus upon mechanisms for managing elite con- 
flict, rather than devolving power to the grassroots level. Some 
of the alternative meanings of political reform are examined 
below. 
Alternative meanings of political reform 
First step in a major programme of reforms, to include the 
bureaucracy and the education system 
This meaning of political reform was sufficiently broad to allow 
for alliances between conservatives and radicals. For Prawes 
himself (who might best be termed a 'radical conservative'), 
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political reform was the cornerstone of a large-scale package of 
measures to transform the state and society in Thailand. Prawes 
had little interest in the legal minutiae which animated many of 
the professional constitution writers with whom he was obliged 
to form a pragmatic alliance. His main preoccupation was in 
generating the momentum for changes which would lead to the 
comprehensive reforms in the bureaucracy and the education 
system, sweeping away the extraordinary over-centralisation 
which was such a debilitating feature of Thai public life. What 
distinguished Prawes from other reformers was the breadth of 
his vision, and his lack of conventional personal ambition, 
Alongside the political reform campaign, he worked on issues 
of social partnership and community building, as well as on 
other areas of public sector reform. One of his preoccupations 
was the strengthening of Thailand's research base through a 
programme of support for Thai academics. Whilst on the one 
hand seeking to create a more rational political and social 
order, he also shamelessly exploited his own extensive personal 
contacts to initiate and pursue his projects: in other words, 
rational goals were sometimes pursued by using paternalistic 
and clientelist methods. 
Many figures with a more progressive political perspective 
than Prawes were in sympathy with his calls for a drastic 
overhaul of the existing order, and especially for an attack on 
the powers and privileges of the bureaucracy. As a member of 
the elite who sympathised (but arguably never fully empa- 
thised) with the needs of poor people, Prawes played a bridg- 
ing role between the political order and the non-governmental 
sector. It is interesting that Prawes saw the 1997 constitution as 
an outcome of the DDC's work, despite the fact that few of the 
DDC's detailed proposals were incorporated into the new con- 
~ti tut ion.~ Just as for the King, one constitution often seemed as 
good as another, for Prawes virtually any political reform was a 
positive step; the core objective was to build up a momentum 
for change. 
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A conservative (and royalist) project to prevent violent 
social disorder 
Dr Prawes had been arguing for some time that there was con- 
siderable potential for violent conflict to break out once again 
in Thai society. He saw three possible causes for such an 
outbreak: the frustrations of people in rural areas, a crisis of 
confidence in the political system, and a third cause, about 
which he did not e lab~ra te .~  At a seminar on 2 November 1995 
at the Siam Inter-Continental Hotel in Bangkok, he hinted at the 
explanation when he declared that people did not want to think 
about what they would do when the King died. Whom would 
they look to for solutions to pressing problems such as traffic 
and f l ~ o d i n g ? ~  This was an extraordinary public statement by 
Prawes: speculation about possible scenarios following the 
death of King Bhumiphol is widespread in private, but never 
aired from a conference platform. Many analysts privately fear 
that the next monarch may lack King Bhumiphol's high level of 
popular legitimacy (accrued during fifty years on the throne), 
and may be unable to make effective interventions at times of 
intense political conflict. As an ardent royalist, Prawes saw the 
monarchy as a central part of the solution, rather than as part of 
the problem itself. Prawes's very clear and public suggestion 
that Thailand might face a potentially violent crisis on the death 
of the King was unprecedented. 
Needless to say, the point was not mentioned in subsequent 
press reports of the speech, and other speakers and questioners 
from the floor failed to follow up on the issue. As a doctor af- 
filiated with Siriraj Hospital (where the King and other mem- 
bers of the royal family received all their medical treatment) 
and a respected senior figure with close personal connections to 
the palace, Prawes may have felt that he was able to make more 
explicit statements about the succession problem than any 
other individual in Thai public life. At the same seminar, he 
argued that even if the DDC proposals were not being imple- 
mented at present, they offered a useful 'way out' in the event 
of a major political crisis. It was clear that Prawes was expect- 
ing just such a crisis any time soon. Although Prawes himself 
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saw reform of the political system as simply the first step in a 
sweeping programme of reforms which wopld also include the 
bureaucracy and the education system, it was also possible to 
regard the whole discourse of political reform as a conservative 
(and royalist) project to prevent violent social disorder. Political 
reform might therefore have two core objectives: to stabilise the 
political system, thereby reducing the potential for severe crises 
which in the past (October 1973, October 1976, April 1981, May 
1992) had involved royal interventions; and to protect the 
institution of the monarchy itself from the threat posed by vio- 
lent instability (such as the instability triggered by a succession 
crisis). The more robust the political system, the less likely it 
was that the monarchy could become a casualty of severe 
political crisis. For Prawes, one goal of political reform was the 
creation of a crisis-proof monarchy, 
A means of pre-emptive crisis management 
On one level political reform was about pre-emptive crisis 
management: putting the right structures in place to cope with 
stresses caused by impending socio-economic and political up- 
heavals. Prawes argued that he was very reluctant to chair the 
Democratic Development Committee when asked to do so in 
1994 by the then President of parliament Marut B ~ n n a g . ~  He 
knew that he would be criticised by the media (which he saw as 
hostile to the Chuan government, and indeed to all govern- 
ments), but his main objective was to avert violence, and to 
help find a way out of the stand-off which would not result in 
the death of Chalard and consequent escalation of the political 
temperature. Yet it also seems likely that the offer from Marut 
to chair the DDC; although in many respects a poisoned 
chalice, offered Prawes an opportunity to pursue his own larger 
objectives of a long-term quest for political stability. One of his 
ultimate goals was the creation of nonviolent mechanisms for 
managing and transferring power. The strength and weakness 
of Prawes's goal of pre-emptive crisis management, was that 
this goal was shared by the very same conservative bureaucrats 
whose power Prawes was hoping to undermine through his 
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reformist programmes. Whilst Prawes was undoubtedly sincere 
in his talk of the need to avoid violence, the repeated invocation 
of potential violence as a rationale for pursuing political reform 
had the effect of concentrating wonderfully the minds of 
bureaucrats, military officers and capital controllers, both 
domestic and international. Indeed, the DDC itself was created 
precisely to head off an impending crisis over the 1994 Chalard 
hunger strike. Prawes demonstrated formidable political skills 
by using the vehicle of a committee that had been created to 
sideline a key issue, in order to keep that issue alive and build a 
broad coalition for political reform. Yet the need to build this 
kind of broad coalition also had the effect of watering down the 
details of the political reforms that were eventually incorpo- 
rated in the 1997 constitution. 
A project by elite conservatives to check the power of 
elected politicians 
For some elite conservatives who paid lip-service to the cause 
of political reform, the process of reforming the political order 
reflected attempts to check the power of elected politicians- 
power which some bureaucrats saw as illegitimate. Military 
officers had long been more or less openly contemptuous of the 
antics of elected politicians, and many civilian bureaucrats 
shared similar views. They believed thet the rise in power of 
political parties and elected politicians had seriously under- 
mined their own influence and standing. 'Parliamentary dicta- 
torship'-one of the eight points Prawes cited as in need of 
reform-had also been one of the five key justifications given 
by the 1991 military junta for their seizure of power. Senior 
figures such as Anand Panyarachun had never concealed their 
distaste for the cut-and-thrust of electoral politics, with its 
culture of vote-buying, sleazy coalition-building, and deal- 
making (see Anand 1994). Many supporters of political reform 
were in fact primarily interested in electoral reform, developing 
mechanisms for curtailing the illicit manipulation of the elec- 
toral process. Although in many respects these criticisms of 
electoral politics were highly justified, the motives of some 
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critics need to be closely scrutinised: how far did these critics 
want to create a cleaner, more representative electoral politics? 
And how far did they wish to undermine the credibility of 
electoral politics, positing the implicit alternative of rule by a 
cabinet of unelected technocrats, backed by the monarchy or 
the military (the model of the much-praised Anand 1 and 
Anand 2 governments)? 
Given that elected politicians were one of the principal tar- 
gets of political reform, their own stance on the issues at stake 
was often ambiguous. Politicians who were major beneficiaries 
of the existing system had little to gain from reforming it; their 
support for reforms was typically highly selective and 
tentative. Although many politicians were reluctant openly to 
denounce calls for reform (thereby laying themselves open to 
the charge of obstructionism and self-interest), the majority 
sought to stall or subvert the reform process using whatever 
mechanisms they could. The politicians who demonstrated the 
greatest enthusiasm for reform were typically those from Bang- 
kok constituencies (where vote-buying and electoral corrup 
tion, though common, were not usually decisive in determining 
political outcomes), or those with strong local followings in 
their home constituencies, who could be confident of re- 
election under almost any reformed system. 
A means of reducing the influence of provincial business 
people 
In part, the interest of Bangkok voters in political reform re- 
flected their reluctance to be ruled by politicians whom they 
regarded as regionalist (Chuan, Chavalit) or provincial 
(Banharn) in outlook. A cynical view is that at the core of 
Bangkokians' demands for political reform was a desire for 
elected representatives sympathetic to the needs of an urban- 
dominated society. For 'central' Bangkok Thais-themselves a 
minority with only 10 per cent of parliamentary seats under 
their control-political reform offered a means to reduce the 
reality of domination by what they regard as the periphery. At 
the same time, whilst most Thai politicians gained their power 
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in the provinces (from elections outside Bangkok), they exer- 
cised that power in the capital. Despite the electoral dominance 
of the provinces, there had been no sustained shift in resources 
beyond Bangkok during the 1980s and 1990s; substantive de- 
centralisation (which would include relocating some ministries 
and corporate headquarters to provincial cities) was not on the 
agenda. But there was certainly a considerable divide between 
the MPs elected in Bangkok (the majority of them respectable, 
educated people from parties such as the Democrats or Palang 
Dharma), and provincial MPs with their criminal connections 
and questionable backgrounds. Nevertheless, genuine reform 
of the political order, which might have allowed articulate and 
sophisticated advocates of voters' interests from the regions to 
gain power and influence, was not in the interests of the Bang- 
kok elite. The prevailing system of 'incompetent' and 'tainted' 
provincial politicians, who were forced to share power with 
technocrat ministers and 'acceptable' allies, was a system which 
in some respects suited the purposes of the Bangkok elite, who 
reaped certain benefits from the discredited and indefensible 
political order. Whilst many advocates of political reform 
sought to marginalise sleazy provincial power-brokers, few 
were altruistic enough to countenance the systematic empower- 
ment of ordinary provincial people. 
The metropolitan business sector, which was more interna- 
tional and transparent in its dealings than its provincial 
counterpart, saw political reform as a means by which a wider 
range of business opportunities could be made available, cur- 
tailing the wheeler-dealing of rural machine politicians and 
their crony contractors, and thereby opening up a wider range 
of markets for their goods and services (Anand 1994: 7). Never- 
theless, metropolitan business was by no means as reputable 
and transparent as it wished to pretend. The economic crisis 
which began in July 1997 revealed the extent to which well- 
known figures in the Thai business community had engaged in 
dubious or disreputable dealings. 
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A means of allowing 'virtuous' technocrats to administer 
the country 
For some conservatives, the rhetoric of political reform offered 
a convenient vehicle for an attempt to inaugurate a 'techno- 
cratic polity', a more sophisticated, more globalised, and more 
responsive version of the 'bureaucratic polity' of the 1950s and 
1960s (see Riggs 1966); yet nevertheless a political system which 
was elite-dominated, and deeply subservient to the needs of 
capital, both domestic and international, perhaps somewhat 
resembling that of Singapore. A Singapore-style technocratic 
state would satisfy all the eight points identified in Prawes's 
diagnosis of Thailand's political ills: the dominance of money 
would be removed (by a 'cleaned up' electoral system); politics 
would no longer be monopolised by a minority (instead, 
technocrats would rule on behalf of the majority); dishonest 
and corrupt behaviour would be purged; parliamentary 
dictatorship would be ended (parliament would become a side- 
show controlled by the executive); political conflict and insta- 
bility would be removed; administrative and legislative func- 
tions would be carried out very effectively; and effective politi- 
cal leadership would be installed. The model for such a polity 
was the Anand 1 and Anand 2 governments, which had seen 
high-calibre technocrats run the country without benefit of par- 
liament or elections. These governments were often praised as 
the best Thailand had ever had. Such a technocratic polity 
would not simply clean up electoral politics, but would effec- 
tively by-pass such politics altogether. 
Much of the discussion along these lines centred upon means 
of separating the functions and duties of the legislature from 
the executive; in other words, to devise ways of preventing 
elected MPs from claiming ministerial positions. At the core of 
these proposals was a desire to ensure that real power lay in the 
hands of 'qualified' individuals (people sympathetic to the 
interests of capital controllers and other elites, typically includ- 
ing retired bureaucrats with a 'clean' image, along with West- 
ern-educated business people and economists), reducing 
elected representatives to minor roles such as answering con- 
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stituents' letters and revising legislation (legislation has never 
had much importance in the Thai political order, since most 
decisions are made by cabinet decree). Although it was un- 
doubtedly the case that many elected politicians were unquali- 
fied for ministerial office, the hostility to elected politicians 
coming from some conservative 'reformers' reflected a desire to 
reverse some recent democratic 'gains', and concentrate power 
in the hands of a small, self-selecting elite. A variety of different 
elites were willing to co-operate for the purposes of marginal- 
ising elected politicians; the precise composition of the techno- 
cracy would itself be the outcome of political contestation be- 
tween rival power groups (for example, military versus civilian, 
and private versus public sector). 
A way of devolving power to the grassroots level 
Another component in the political reform movement was the 
sector aligned with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and people's organisations (POs). This sector was deeply dis- 
appointed with the failure of the political order to address 
popular grievances such as economic inequality and poor legal 
rights. Why did a political system dominated by rural-based 
parties and politicians deliver so little to the rural voters who 
elected them? NGO and PO groups sought political reforms 
that would undermine the existing elite-dominated structures, 
and empower villagers and people at the grassroots level, 
inverting the hierarchical pyramid of Thailand's state and 
society (see Naruemon 1997). Some of their input into the 
political reform process was based upon their experience of 
working with the election-monitoring body Pollwatch 
(Ongkorn Klang) during the five 1992-97 general elections. 
Pollwatch Secretary-General Gothom Ariya was one of the 
leading figures in this group. Despite (or because of) their 
commitment and expertise, groups seeking to influence politi- 
cal reform in order to devolve more power to the grassroots 
were regarded with deep suspicion by most other participants 
in the political reform process, especially by the Ministry of 
Interior. The Ministry of Interior-a vast bureaucracy respon- 
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sible both for administering Thailand's provinces in a top- 
down, colonial-style fashion, and for controlling the electoral 
process on the ground-had as its core objective the defence of 
the status quo. In the debate over political reform, the Ministry 
of Interior mobilised a range of forces, from organised groups 
of village headmen to sympathetic senators and academics, in 
order to resist the inclusion of decentralising principles within 
any political reform package. Even within the non-govern- 
mental sector, there were wide differences of opinion: some 
NGOs took a broadly conservative, top-down view, in contrast 
with the radical and critical perspectives expressed by grass- 
roots PO networks such as Forum of the Poor and the Small 
Scale Farmers' Federation of the Northeast. 
The prelude to redrafting 
Throughout the 1995 election campaign, politicians of all 
parties were pressed by the media on their plans for political 
reform. Chart Thai leader Banharn Silpa-archa, acting on advice 
from close aides, grasped the nettle by proclaiming his com- 
mitment to a thorough overhaul of the political system. Implau- 
sible though this pledge appeared coming from an old-style 
rural machine politician, it gave Chart Thai an edge over the 
Democrats which was to prove crucial. On assuming the 
premiership in July 1995, Banharn established the Political 
Reform Committee (PRC), chaired by his ex-political scientist 
brother Chumphol. Little was heard about political reform 
from Banharn thereafter, but the issue remained a topic of 
popular debate, sustained by the media and a low-key but 
persistent campaign by Dr Prawes and other social critics (see 
McCargo 1997a: 37-39). The print media played an important 
role in demands for political reform from 1995 to 1997. One 
regular venue for such campaigning was the Phujatlcarn Daily 
newspaper, and especially the regular columns of Chai-Anan 
Samudavanija, Kasian Techapira, and Khamnoon Sitthisaman, 
who wrote some of his columns under the pen name 'Rambutri 
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516'. Critics of what might be termed the 'Phujatkarn school' of 
political reform argue that the columns sometimes had a repeti- 
tive, self-important quality. But support for political reform 
from Phujatkarn, and from other serious newspapers such as 
Siam Post and The Nation, helped sustain the pressure on the 
Chuan, Banharn and Chavalit governments to initiate constitu- 
tional change. Similar demands were reflected in the electronic 
media, and were echoed by numerous academics and social 
critics in the panel discussions which are such a salient feature 
of Thai intellectual life. 
In late 1996, progress was made towards the goal of constitu- 
tional reform when a compromise was struck concerning the 
composition of a new Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA). 
The ninety-nine members of the Assembly were selected from 
two sources: seventy-six were indirectly elected provincial 
representatives (one per province), while twenty-three were 
experts in political science, law, politics and public administra- 
tion (the 'professional constitution drafters'). Despite a complex 
nomination process, the final selection of CDA members was 
made by parliament. Prior to the elections for the CDA, one 
newspaper published a list of 'government-approved' candi- 
dates, which closely resembled the final composition of the 
CDA. Nearly a quarter of CDA members were ex-MPs, whilst 
there were also numerous lawyers and retired bureaucrats. The 
CDA was an essentially conservative, government-approved 
body. 
Drafting procedures for the 1997 constitution 
An elaborate drafting process was devised for the 1997 consti- 
tution, one that went through the motions of broad consulta- 
tion, but actually reflected a largely top-down process (for 
details, see Ockey 1997: 313-15). A constitution-drafting com- 
mittee prepared a detailed draft which was then submitted to 
the ninety-nine-member Constitution Drafting Assembly 
(CDA) for approval. Once a draft had been approved by the 
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CDA, a process of public consultation took place on a nation- 
wide basis, co-ordinated by the public relations committee. 
Public hearings were held, and input solicited. In this respect, 
the 1997 constitution-drafting process was characterised by a 
much more open spirit of debate than any previous drafting 
process, with the honourable exception of 1974. The constitu- 
tion-drafting committee finalised a draft; this was checked and 
approved by the CDA, which then submitted it to parliament. 
Parliament was not given the option of amending the draft, but 
was obliged either to ratify or to reject it. Had parliament failed 
to approve the draft, a nation-wide referendum was to have 
been held to determine whether or not the new constitution 
should be adopted, One strong point of the process was its use 
of fixed deadlines for each stage of the drafting; the pressure to 
meet these deadlines built up a powerful momentum, which 
was ultimately almost impossible for the government to con- 
trol. 
Whilst the constitution-drafting process went through the 
motions of public consultation by making use of an 'elected' 
CDA, and by sounding out public opinion during the 'public 
hearing' phase, the fact was that the process remained heavily 
elite-dominated. Dr Prawes criticised the lack of genuine public 
participation in the constitution-drafting process, and 
expressed the fear that there might be more violent demonstra- 
tions in the future if the charter did not reflect popular wishes 
(Bangkok Post 'Constitution special', 27 March 1997). Sympto- 
matic of the tokenistic character of the public consultation was 
the provision that voters would only participate in a referen- 
dum on the constitution if the draft were first rejected by par- 
liament. A popular referendum to approve or reject the consti- 
tution (as staged in the Philippines in 1987) would have been a 
real milestone in increased popular participation in Thailand. 
The constitution-drafting process also was a source of vast 
quantities of patronage. Members of the various committees 
and of the CDA itself received generous meeting allowances 
and other perks, while the public relations committee dispersed 
a huge budget to organisations all over the country, for the 
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rather vague task of promoting popular awareness of the con- 
stitution-drafting process. Those involved in the constitution- 
drafting process were able to engage in considerable self-pro- 
motion, giving interviews to the press and electronic media and 
making other public appearances. For many of those involved, 
membership of the CDA or one of the various committees was 
an important means of launching, sustaining, or relaunching a 
career as a politician or public intellectual. 
In the event, the economic crisis which engulfed Thailand 
following the defacto devaluation of the baht in July 1997 over- 
shadowed the constitution-drafting process. The Thai govern- 
ment spent much of August 1997 locked in negotiations with 
the IMF, trying to bail the country out of its desperate financial 
plight. Although some politicians tried to block parliamentary 
approval of the draft constitution (notably the powerful Interior 
Minister and New Aspiration Party Secretary-General Sanoh 
Tienthong), Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh recognised 
that parliamentary rejection of the draft would only serve 
further to undermine his precarious political standing. Despite 
the advice of certain key lieutenants such as Sanoh, Chavalit 
reluctantly backed the draft constitution, which was passed by 
a large parliamentary majority. Thus the need for an expensive 
and complex referendum process was averted; the politicians 
were able to save their resources for the next general election, 
which they feared might come soon. In the event, the passage 
of the constitution could not save Chavalit, and in November 
1997 his government was replaced by a new coalition led by 
former Premier Chuan Leekpai, a coalition that had emerged 
without the holding of a new election. 
The new constitution, which came into effect in November 
1997, was a lengthy document of questionable quality (Thai 
Constitution 1997). It contained no less than 336 articles, as com- 
pared with the 7 articles of the US constitution, and the 103 arti- 
cles of the Japanese constitution. Many of the points in the new 
Thai constitution (for example, attendance requirements for 
senators, qualifications of voters, the requirement to pay taxes) 
were matters covered by conventional legislation in other 
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states, In part, the constitution reflected the weakness of the 
legislature and the paucity of other legislation: laws that had no 
business being included in the constitution at all were inserted 
into it, since otherwise they might never be enacted at all. This 
was precisely the danger which King Bhumiphol had urged the 
members of the CDA to avoid, in his remarks to them on 18 
January 1997 (Royal Remarks, n.d.: 42): 
... if you make it too detailed, it will be difficult to 
draft a proper constitution because, in fact, a consti- 
tution is a law that is the "mother of all laws", or is a 
law that lays down the foundations for the various 
rules governing the country. 
Members of the drafting committee fought to insert pet themes 
and favourite details from previous constitutions into the 1997 
constitution, and thereby produced a catch-all document with a 
rambling, miscellaneous character. For many of those involved 
in drafting the constitution, this was their sole opportunity to 
introduce legal reforms. The excessive specificity of the consti- 
tution meant that it was unlikely to stand the test of time. 
John Girling, writing of the 1932-80 period, described Thai 
'constitutions' (he puts the word in inverted commas) as 
'repeated, but vain, attempts to find a solution' to the lack of 
legitimacy enjoyed by successive regimes. He notes that these 
attempts had proved uninspiring (Girling 1981: 151). Similar 
observations could be made about the 1997 constitution, which 
contained a hotchpotch of different measures, and reflected a 
variety of compromises between competing interest groups. 
Nevertheless, the process of drafting the new constitution did 
generate a momentum which a weak government and sham- 
bolic parliament found impossible fully to resist or control, 
testifying to the disorderly pluralism of Thailand's multiple 
elites. 
The new constitution did contain a number of interesting 
electoral reforms, notably the rule preventing politicians from 
switching parties less than 90 days before an election (designed 
to prevent the horse-trading of electable candidates which had 
come to precede every Thai general election campaign), and the 
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switch from multi-member constituencies to a combination of a 
'party slate' proportional representation system, plus single- 
member constituencies. Although these changes might under- 
mine existing patterns of vote-buying and electoral corruption, 
many analysts feared that politicians would soon find ways of 
circumventing the measures, changing the rules but continuing 
to play a broadly similar game. Indeed, the general election that 
followed a political reform bill introduced in Japan in 1994 
(with the same combination of proportional representation and 
single-seat constituencies) produced a parliament containing 
almost exactly the same faces as the former system of rnulti- 
member constituencies. In some respects, the most interesting 
reforms of the new constitution lay not in the probably doomed 
attempts to transform the nature of electoral politics, but in 
provisions that permitted citizens to challenge the power of the 
state, such as Article 56, which gave people the right to sue the 
government or state agencies for harming the environment. 
Although most of these provisions were (doubtless deliber- 
ately) vaguely worded, they could form the basis for legal and 
other challenges to abuses of power, thereby offering increased 
room for manoeuvre by NGOs and community activists. 
Conclusion 
Constitutional reform has a long and dubious history in Thai- 
land. The 1997 constitutional reform process illustrated many 
of the worst features of that history: questionable objectives, 
elite dominance, high-level squabbling, parliamentary 
ineptitude, self-interested drafting bodies, and a badly written 
final product. There are ample grounds for regarding the 
preoccupation with constitutional reform, which characterises 
many sections of the Thai elite, as a kind of terminal political 
malaise. 
The positive results which have emerged from the process 
are often largely unintended by the main sponsors of reform; 
for example, the 1991 constitution revision process helped 
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spawn an organised opposition to the National Peace Keeping 
Council, which later culminated in the ouster of General 
Suchinda from the premiership in May 1992. Similarly, as part 
of the trade-offs done to hustle through the 1997 constitution, a 
few progressive articles were allowed to remain in the final ver- 
sion, articles which may help sow the seeds for future agitation 
and social change. The open character of public debate in Thai- 
land by the late 1990s certainly represented a dramatic 
improvement on the political conditions of the 1960s and 1970s. 
To borrow the King's words about the 1991 constitution, the 
1997 constitution is 'not fully adequate', and is unlikely to 
stand the test of time. However, the transience of most Thai 
constitutions is testimony to the pace of political life in Thai- 
land, and to the ever-present potential for dynamism and 
change. 
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Notes 
There are various competing lists of Thai constitutions in circulation; the 
most accurate appears to be Vichai 1997: 60-63, which lists sixteen as 
follows: 1932 (June), 1932 (December), 1946, 1947, 1949, 1952, 1959, 1968, 
1972,1974,1976,1977,1978,1991 (March), 1991 (December), and 1997. 
Suthep, an influential Democrat Party MP and power broker from the 
Southern province of Nakhon Si Thammarat, was at the centre of a land 
reform scandal which led to the demise of the 1992-95 Chuan government. 
Nevertheless, at the start of his second term as Prime Minister in November 
1997, Chuan Leekpai appointed Suthep to the powerful and potentially 
lucrative post of Minister of Communications. 
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Anand, a respected former diplomat and business leader, served two 
terms as an unelected Prime Minister in 1991 and 1992. 
Interview with Dr Prawes Wasi, 6 August 1998. 
' Interview with Dr Prawes Wasi, 13 November 1995. 
Author's fieldnotes, 2 November 1995. 
Interview with Dr Prawes Wasi, 13 November 1995. 
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